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Abstract
A modified version of a finite random field Ising ferromagnetic model
in an external magnetic field at zero temperature is presented to describe
group decision making. Fields may have a non-zero average. A postu-
late of minimum inter-individual conflicts is assumed. Interactions then
produce a group polarization along one very choice which is however
randomly selected. A small external social pressure is shown to have
a drastic effect on the polarization. Individual bias related to personal
backgrounds, cultural values and past experiences are introduced via
quenched local competing fields. They are shown to be instrumental
in generating a larger spectrum of collective new choices beyond initial
ones. In particular, compromise is found to result from the existence of
individual competing bias. Conflict is shown to weaken group polariza-
tion. The model yields new psycho-sociological insights about consensus
and compromise in groups.
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1 Physical approach to social behavior
Some attempts to use Statistical Physics to decribe various aspects of social
behavior started long ago [1], for instance to study strike process [2]. They are
getting more numerous in recent years. Among others, we can cite political
organisation [3], group power dynamics [4], social impact [5], outbreak of co-
operation [6], stock market [7], the DNA analyse [8], evolution theory [9] and
ageing [10].
Social systems often involve cooperative behavior of some small or large
numbers of people. The main difficulties in studying these systems is believed
to result from the rich variety of existing individual features [11, 12]. The
complexity of a group could thus be expected to increase with its size. However
crowds, which contain large numbers of persons, behave in some aspects like
one collective individual making some behavior even simpler than in the case
of one individual [13].
The theory of critical phenomena can indeed shed light on above paradox.
In particular, the two basic concepts of universality and irrelevant variables [14]
which mean physical characteristics like the form of microscopic interactions
and their physical nature have no effect on the universal properties of the
collective behavior, are of importance to tackle social behavior.
Along these two concepts, it makes sense to suppose there exists in social
systems too, on the one hand, many properties associated with purely individ-
ual characteristics, and on the other, some few properties which produce the
collective social state [15]. More precisely, the hypothesis behind the present
approach is that micro-macro relationships are universal and hold true beyond
the nature of the various entities involved.
In this paper we study group decisison making, in particular conditions
which lead to either a polarization or a compromise of the group [15, 16]. Here
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“polarization” means that most of the people move in one direction [17].
To keep the presentation simple, we used a model in which a group of
N persons has to make a decision restricted to two options. Each person
can choose between only “yes” and “no”. The model is articulated around
a Postulate of minimum pair individual conflict. Competing interactions are
also introduced via local quenched biases.
Formally we are using a modified version of the random field Ising fer-
romagnetic model in an external magnetic field at zero temperature. However
here the system is finite in size. Moreover “random fields” may have a non-zero
configurational average. Results may depend on the field configuration.
Our model does not aim to novelty in Statistical Physics but instead
sheds a new light on various aspects of human behavior. Moreover it provides
ground to a class of possible social experiments. Thus we tried to write the
paper such that it can be understood by non-physicists.
Section 2 considers the simplest situation introducing the symmetrical
individual. It is then extended to the symmetrical group in section 3. Interac-
tions are introduced as well as a measure of the group conflict. The concept
of a symmetry breaking choice is defined in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the
group emergence from isolated individuals to integrated group members. The
group formation process is analysed using individual anticipating. In partic-
ular we study mechanisms by which either a compromise or a polarization of
the group is produced. Social surrounding pressure and individual differences
are included in Section 6 with the bias individual. This bias accounts for in-
dividual representations [18] which are well established in social sciences. It
results from cultural values, beliefs and personal experiences. The model is il-
lustrated through a few examples in Section 7. We present respectively cases of
balanced equal representations, balanced unequal representations, minorities
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and leaders. The last Section contains concluding remarks about extension of
the model to non-rational behavior, i. e., non-zero temperature.
2 The symmetric individual
We start from the simplest situation in which one individual has to make a
choice between two answers either yes or no.
Such cases are indeed numerous in the social world. Moreover cases with
a larger spectrum of answers can usually be mapped at some approximative
level into a two-answer case [17]. The individual choice can then be represented
by a two-valued variable c with c = 1 associated to answer yes and c = −1 to
answer no.
For a collection of N persons each individual choice is represented by a
variable ci, where i = 1, 2, ..., N and ci = ±1.
A collective choice of the N person group can be defined as the simple
sum of each individual choice,
C =
N∑
i=1
ci . (1)
From Eq. (1) it is seen that aggregation enlarges drastically the spectrum of
possible choices. It actually increases from 2 at the individual level up to 2N
at the group level. Nevertheless to materialize this spectrum a structure to
collect individual answers, to sum them up and to display the net result is
necessary.
Moreover, to go beyond initial twofold answer requires some complex
internal transformation in order to associate a meaning to each one of the 2N
answers. However the use of some rules, for instance a majority rule, can bring
the collective choice back to the individual one with only two answers.
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3 The symmetrical group
At this stage yes and no are equiprobable. The probability distribution func-
tion is therefore,
p(ci) =
1
2
{δ(ci − 1) + δ(ci + 1)} , (2)
where δ is the Kronecker function.
Considering N isolated individuals, each one makes its choice without
any interaction with others. The probability distribution for the collection of
N persons is thus,
p(C) =
N∏
i=1
p(ci) , (3)
where p(ci) is given by Eq. (2).
From Eqs. (2) and (3) the collective choice C is indeed zero on average,
with fluctuations of order 1√
N
. The result C = 0 creates a new qualitative
choice which did not exist at the individual level.
C = 0 can be understood as the perfect compromise choice. Since the
macroscopic quantity C is zero, the aggregation process turns out to have no
effect at the macro-level making the associated group symmetrical. Perfect
compromise means no group existence as such, it is a a neutral group with no
link among group members.
We now proceed to introduce interactions. Given a pair of persons i and
j, only four different choice configurations can be produced. These are, (1)
ci = cj = +1, (2), ci = cj = −1, (3), ci = −cj = +1, and (4), ci = −cj =
−1. In configurations 1 and 2 the two persons i and j are making the same
choice. They disagree in configurations 3 and 4 with opposite choices, they
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are at conflict. However agreement or conflict materializes only if i and j are
both aware of the other’s choice, in other words, only once they are somehow
interacting.
We can thus naturally identify a state of conflict (configurations 3 and
4) or agreement (configurations 1 and 2) using the product cicj . It is equal
to +1 in agreement and to −1 in conflict. From now on, agreement is defined
as a positive conflict. Both cases do not differentiate which choice is actually
made, in accordance with the group symmetrical nature.
However prior to the decision itself, both individuals may, for instance,
argue for a long time, or exchange written information. On the other hand,
they may decide without any discussion. We thus need to introduce a quantity
to measure this choice involment. Let us call I the exchange amplitude. This
parameter can be incorporated into the configurational choice labelling using
the product Icicj instead of cicj. An agreement state is associated with (+I)
while (−I) corresponds to a conflict state. I measures the conflict amplitude.
Restricting interaction to pairs the overall group conflict is measured by
the function,
GI ≡ I
∑
<i,j>
cicj , (4)
where we have assumed that the exchange amplitude I is constant for all
interacting (i, j) pairs. We call GI the group internal conflict function and
< i, j > represents all interacting pairs.
4 The symmetry breaking choice
The internal conflict function GI measures the conflict amplitude in a group for
each one of the 2N decisional configurations. It discriminates among various
6
possible choices, but does not indicate which one is chosen by the group. For
the group decision dynamics to operate, it is necessary to invoke a criterion to
select which among possible states is favored by the group.
Along the minimum ernergy principle, we introduce a Postulate to de-
termine the group dynamics direction. It reads,
“Each individual favors the choice which minimizes its own conflict”.
A given person will thus select its choice according to a minimum conflict
principle. Justification of this Postulate is beyond the scope of the present
work. It will be motivated a postiori by the results obtained from the model.
Minimum conflict means maximum agreement.
To grasp part of the decision making dynamics we can start randomly
from one person who made at random a choice of either yes or no. Afterwards
it does not change its choice. Then all persons interacting with this particular
person will make the same choice, to minimize their own conflicts. Within a
sequence process all people interacting with them will again make the same
choice to favor agreement. In so doing the whole group will end up making
the same initial choice the first person did select.
The net result of these dynamics is an extreme polarization of collective
choice with C = ±N . The sign, i. e., the polarization direction, is determined
by the initial individual choice which was made randomly. This polarization
phenomenon holds whoever is chosen to be the initial person. Only the direc-
tion (yes or no) will change from one initial person to another one.
In real life situations, the above process starts simultaneously from sev-
eral persons. The dynamics of choice spreading is a rather complex phe-
nomenon. Monte Carlo simulations on zero-temperature dynamics on the Ising
model showed indeed non trivial behavior at all dimensions [19]. However, the
group succeeds somehow to select only one intial choice at long distance al-
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lowing everyone to minimze its own conflicts. Therefore we conclude,
Symmetrical groups polarize themselves towards an extreme choice. The
direction of that choice however is arbitrary. Each extreme is equiprobable.
From the definition of the group internal conflict function GI (Eq. 4)
and above polarization result, the Postulate of individual minimum conflict
turns out to be identical to maximize GI .
The polarization effect which results from group member interactions is
identical to the Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking phenomenon well known in
the physics of collective phenomena [14]. Individual local interactions make the
group to behave as one super-person [13]. That super-person chooses between
two possible choices with equiprobability likewise the isolated individual.
In parallel the individual within the group has lost its freedom of choice.
It must now make a choice identical to people it interacts with. Individual
freedom has been given up in favor to group freedom.
Here perfect compromise has disappeared. Simultaneously the group de-
cision produces an effect on its surrounding somehow proportional to N since
C = ±N . Without interactions ci = ±1 individual were overall self-neutralised
macroscopically. Interactions have produced strong individual correlations as-
sociated with a Symmetry Breaking.
Our finding sheds new light on results obtained from group decision mak-
ing experiments conducted in social psychology. The polarization effect was
clearly evident in data reported in [17]. However, until now, most theoretical
explanations have been unconvincing in connecting choices at respectively the
individual level [12] and the group level [16]. Our proposal is that polarization
effect arises quite naturally from first principles, i. e., from interactions.
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5 Anticipating effect
At this stage we need to formalize the internal group dynamics which proceeds
from initial individual choices towards the final collective choice. The exchange
term must be modified to account for the emergent group reality. We first
rewrite GI as,
GI =
I
2
N∑
i=1
{
n∑
k=1
cj(k)
}
ci . (5)
where n is the number of persons one individual interacts with. To keep
the presentation simple this number is assumed equal for everyone. In case
everyone interacts with everyone n = N .
Now we modify Eq. (5) to account for the process of group formation.
People do anticipate the emergence of a collective choice. Each individual i
will thus try to project through its partner’s choices cj (the people i discusses
with), its expectation of the overall final group decision.
Individual i then extrapolates the j’s choice cj to the expected collective
choice the group will eventually make without its own participation. Within
this process, individual i perceives the j’s choice as given by the transformation,
cj →
1
N − 1
(C − ci) , (6)
where C is the collective choice defined as before. Once this process is com-
pleted, Eq. (5) becomes,
G
g
I =
I
2
N∑
i=1


n∑
j=1
1
N − 1
(C − ci)

 ci , (7)
9
and,
G
g
I =
In
2(N − 1)
{
C
N∑
i=1
ci −
N∑
i=1
c2i
}
, (8)
where superscript g denotes active anticipating process. Using the collective
choice definition C =
∑N
i=1 ci and the property c
2
i = 1 we get,
G
g
I = γ
C
N
N∑
i=1
ci − γ , (9)
where γ ≡ nIN
2(N−1) is a constant independent of the group choice. As such it is
irrelevant to the collective choice. C is not yet the final decision. Rather it is
the expected final collective choice. We can rewrite Eq. (9) in the form,
G
g
I = Sg
N∑
i=1
ci − γ . (10)
where
Sg ≡ γ
C
N
(11)
acts as a group field which couples with each individual choice. The field notion
is a natural way to account for some pressure towards a definite choice. Within
our convention of minimum conflict the product Sgci measures that influence.
A positive field Sg favors a positive choice +1, while −1 is associated to a
negative field. The conflict amplitude is given by Sg.
We have indeed a self-consistent expression since on one hand, individual
i wants to go along the virtual field Sg, and on the other hand it contributes
directly to this virtual field through its dependance on the collective choice C.
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Rewriting Eq. (10) as
G
g
I = γ
C2
N
− γ (12)
shows that maximizing GgI results in maximizing C
2 which is obtained by
C2 = N2. It is an extreme polarization with either C = +N or C = −N .
Again individual minimum conflicts appear clearly identical to the maximum
of the group internal conflict function.
At this stage of the model our “group formation process” is formally
identical to the mean field theory of phase transitions. While in physics, it is
an approximation, here it embodies the social mechanism of anticipation.
6 The bias individual
We are now in position to overcome two simplifying assumptions made earlier.
First, most choices an individual and a group have to make are not independent
of the surroundings as assumed above. We now will account for pressure
applied to the group from the outside. Second, assuming identical individuals,
with no apriori individual differences in preferences about the issue, does not
hold in most cases. Individual differences will now be included.
6.1 Social pressure
The existence of external pressure on group members means the equiprobabil-
ity hypothesis (Eq. 2) no longer holds. It is achieved introducing a quantity
which differentiates the two possible choices. We call this quantity the so-
cial field S. It turns the symmetrical individual into a social one with now
p (ci = 1) 6= p (ci = −1).
Similarly with above group field Sg, each person’s conflict with S is
represented by the product Sci. Agreement is associated with Sci > 0, i. e.,
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the choice is made along the field with S and ci having the same sign. In
contrast Sci < 0 represents a conflict between the individual and the social
pressure, since S and ci have opposite signs. The surrounding group conflict
measure is,
GS ≡
N∑
i=1
Sci . (13)
Applying the Postulate to the sum GgI+GS still results in an extreme polariza-
tion but now its direction is no longer random. The group choice is C = +N
for S > 0, and C = −N with S < 0. Under external pressure, even extremely
weak, the group and the individual behave identically. They both follow the
pressure induced by the external pressure. The Symmetry Breaking choice is
no longer random.
Here the super-person represented by the whole group is identical to the
individual person. They are both aligned along the field. This result is at
contrast with the symmetrical state, where the individual loses its freedom of
choice in favor of the group choice freedom.
6.2 The Representational state
To get closer to experimental situations, individual differences in preferences
about some issues are now introduced. Following social literature they are
called “individual representations” [18]. A representation varies in both, di-
rection and amplitude, from one person to another. It depends upon cultural
values, past experiences, ethics and beliefs. It is attached to a person.
The representational effect can be included within our formalism by in-
troducing an additional field. We call Si the internal social field attached to
individual i. Its properties are similar to those of a social field S. The differ-
ence being that the social field applies uniformly to each group member while
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an internal social field acts only on one person.
As for the other fields, conflict with the internal social field is accounted
for in the product Sici. It is positive for a choice made along the representation
(internal agreement with personal values), and negative otherwise (internal
conflict with personal values). The group representation conflict measure is
given by,
GR ≡
N∑
i=1
Sici . (14)
The distribution of individual representations is required to determined
the group collective choice. The representation effect is enhanced in the
isolated-person case where both exchange amplitude and social external field
are zero. There, from the Postulate, final decision is found to result from every
individual following its own representation. It gives,
C =
N∑
i=1
Si
|Si|
, (15)
where the |...| denotes absolute value.
This equation illustrates the qualitatitve change driven by the existence
of representations. Actual C value can now vary over the whole spectrum
of values −N, ..., 0, ...,+N . Compromise C = 0 can again be an outcome.
Individual representations are thus instrumental for making the whole model
relevant to real situations in which collective choices are far richer than C =
±N .
In others words, prior to group formation, individuals have their own
representations which determine their apriori answers to the initial question.
All these representations result in either yes or no. Then, in the process of
13
group formation, people start to interact through the yes and no distribution
in the group.
However to reach a collective choice, due to the existence of opposite
representations, people must construct new answers in addition to the initial
yes and no. Answers are thus enriched during group formation, due to driving
representations. On the other hand, within the neutral state groups do not
produce new answers.
Once the final decision is reached, each group member identifies with the
collective choice triggering its new individual choice to d = C
N
which may differ
from the initial ci. In the neutral state d = ±1.
Thus, in the process of building a new answer d, a new representation
has been produced by the group. This new representation is integrated by each
individual to yield the d choice. Group formation has qualitatively modified
individual representations.
This process shows that while individuals resist adopting a representa-
tion opposed to their own, via the group transformation, they will join a new
common representation which accounts for the overall balance of initial rep-
resentations. The preceding takes place around a new answer which did not
exist prior to the group forming.
Note our qualitative departure from usual Statistical Physics. Here we
are not considering an average individual position, but a well defined and
fixed individual position. This position results from the group forming. In
most cases d is different from ±1. We are thus passing from a class of Ising
variables ci = ±1 to one continuous variable
−1
N
≤ d ≥ +1
N
.
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6.3 The frustrated individual
Adding together all the effects introduced until now results in an extended
group internal conflict function G = GgI +GS +GR which is,
G = I
∑
i,j
cicj + S
N∑
i=1
ci +
N∑
i=1
Sici . (16)
The extended form of Eq. (16) makes maximizing G a more difficult task
since competing effects are active. A given individual wants now to minimize
its overall own conflict. There exist three contributions,
• Interacting group members: the individual wants to come up with the
same final decision as preferred by interaction partners.
• External social field: the individual wants to comply to the external
pressure from immediate surroundings.
• Internal social field: the individual wants to comply to the internal pres-
sure from its personal representations.
These three elements are not necessarily satisfied simultaneously. From the
Postulate, the individual wants to minimize overall personal conflict. It could
result in simultaneous agreement with some of above items, and conflict with
others. It is clearer to write Eq. (16) as,
G =
N∑
i=1
Srg,ici − γ , (17)
where,
Srg,i = Sg + S + Si , (18)
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is the resulting field applied to individual i in the group formation process.
Maximum G and minimum individual conflicts are achieved when each indi-
vidual follows his resulting field sign. If Srg,i > 0, then ci = 1 and ci = −1 for
Srg,i < 0.
The case Srg,i = 0 results in an undetermination of the i choice as in the
isolated neutral case. Satisfying Srg,i sign does imply satisfying simultaneously
S, Si, and Sg signs. This competing effect is the signature of the psychological
complexity involved in the decision making process. Each person first follows
its resulting field Srg,i to produce a collective choice C. Then this collective
choice is individualy integrated back with ci → d =
C
N
.
7 Illustration of the model
To gain a deeper insight about the meaning of Eqs. (17) and (18), we now
analyse four different specific cases. Each will illustrate some basic feature of
the model.
7.1 Two balanced opposite biases case
We consider an evenly divided group of N persons with no external social field,
i. e., S = 0. Half the persons have a positive representation Si = +S0, and the
other half have a negative representation with the same amplitude Sj = −S0.
The whole group has thus no net representation. Interactions are of amplitude
I and each person discusses with n other persons. In small, face-to-face groups,
everyone usually interacts with everyone else, so n = N . The corresponding
internal conflict function is,
G = −γ +
γ
N
C2 +
N
2
(S0c
+
i − S0c
−
j ) , (19)
16
where c+i and c
−
j are attached to persons with respectively positive and negative
representation. The constant γ ≡ nIN
2(N−1) has been introduced earlier in the
group formation section. The collective choice may be written as C = N
2
(c+i +
c−j ). The actual choice is the one which maximises G. In this case it is easily
singled out, since there exist only two different kinds of persons symbolised
by c+i and c
−
j . Four choice configurations are possible, (a) c
+
i = +1; c
−
j =
+1; C = N , (b) c+i = −1; c
−
j = −1; C = −N , (c) c
+
i = +1; c
−
j = −1; C = 0,
(d) c+i = −1; c
−
j = +1; C = 0.
The first two (a and b) are agreement and others (c and d) are conflict.
Associated internal conflict functions are, G(a) = G(b) = −γ + Nγ, G(c) =
−γ +NS0, G(d) = −γ −NS0.
Clearly G(d) < G(c), reducing the choice to either (a and b) or (c). In
case γ > S0, we have G(a, b) > G(c), indicating that the interaction strength
proportional to nI is stronger than S0. The group then polarizes with C = ±N .
The direction of the extreme choice occurs at random.
Half of the members are fully satisfied with both their representation and
their partners while the other half is in conflict with its own representation.
This result means in particular that the “losing” subgroup has to build a new
representation which embodies some level of internal conflict. The “winning”
part does not modify its initial representation. In this case, no new answer
was built. We have ci → d = ±1.
On the other hand, strong representation, i. e., γ < S0 favors compro-
mise, with the collective choice C = 0. Each member i starts from a personal
representation to decide eventually through weak interactions on a medium
compromise, with the creation of a new answer d = 0. Again, this compromise
choice did not exist prior to the group formation. It is the result of cooperation
between the group level and the individual level.
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Within a balanced representation group, exchange favors a compromise.
Weak exchange result in an extreme polarization along a random direction.
7.2 Two unbalanced opposite biases case
We now go back to the previous example, but consider a stronger positive
representation. This is done by writing the negative representation fields as
Sj = −αS0, with 0 < α < 1. Respective numbers of positive and nega-
tive representations are equal. Only the internal conflict function values are
changed to become respectively, G(a) = −γ + Nγ + N
2
(1 − α)S0, G(b) =
−γ +Nγ − N
2
(1− α)S0, G(c) = −γ +
N
2
(1 + α)S0, G(d) = −γ −
N
2
(1 + α)S0.
Since 0 < α < 1, G(a) < G(b) and G(d) < G(c), always. However in the
case γ > S0 the polarization direction is determined with C = +N .
Before we had α = 1 which made the direction arbitrary, but now it is
the strongest initial representation which wins. The discussion process within
the forming group has made the weaker-biased people align themselves with
the stronger ones. Here we have ci → d = 1.
In order for a compromise outcome to be favored, a decrease in exchanges
among group members is required. For γ < S0, the final choice is C = 0 which
gives ci → d = 0.
Within an unbalanced representation group, exchange favors the initially
strongest representation. Only a limitation of exchange may produce a
compromise.
7.3 The minority case
Most cases do not have an equal number of people in two opposite subgroups.
Usually there exist a majority and a minority. Let us consider a minority
number M of people (M < N
2
) with a positive representation Si = +S0. The
majority then contains (N−M) with an unequal negative representation Sj =
18
−αS0. We chose, for instance, the case of a minority more motivated than the
majority, i. e., 0 < α < 1.
Denoting c+i and c
−
j the respective minority and majority choices, the
collective choice is given by C = Mc+i + (N − M)c
−
j . The internal conflict
function is G = n
2(N−1)IC
2 + (Mc+i − (N −M)αc
−
j )S0. Associated four choice
configurations are, (a) c+i = +1; c
−
j = +1; C = N , (b) c
+
i = −1; c
−
j = −1; C =
−N , (c) c+i = +1; c
−
j = −1; C = 2M − N , (d) c
+
i = −1; c
−
j = +1; C =
−2M +N .
The first two (a and b) are minority-majority agreement while the others
(c and d) are minority-majority conflict. Associated internal conflict functions
are, G(a) = −γ + Nγ + {(1 + α)M − αN}S0, G(b) = −γ + Nγ − {(1 +
α)M − αN}S0, G(c) = −γ +
γ
N
(2M − N)2 + {(1 − α)M + αN}S0 G(d) =
−γ + γ
N
(2M −N)2 − {(1− α)M + αN}S0.
Analysis of above expressions is complicated since now several parame-
ters are involved. There are N , M , nI, S0 and α. Let us comment on some
cases. Again, case (d) is never selected since indeed nothing is satisfied in that
case, neither interactions nor representations.
• Interaction effects are winning over representation effects: the group is
polarized, i. e., G(a) or G(b) > G(c).
(a) The minority wins, turning the majority to its side if G(a) > G(b).
It is the case if M < (N −M)α. Condition G(a) > G(c) is ensured
by nIM > (N − 1)αS0.
(b) The majority wins, turning the minority to its side if G(a) < G(b).
It is the case if M > (N − M)α. Condition G(b) > G(c) is en-
sured by nI(N −M) > (N − 1)S0. The condition does not depend
on α since in both cases (b) and (c) the majority follows its own
representation −αS0.
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• Representation effects are winning over interaction effects: the group is
balanced, i. e., G(a) and G(b) < G(c).
Condition G(a) < G(c) is ensured by nIM < (N − 1)αS0. Condition
G(b) < G(c) is ensured by nI(N−M) < (N−1)S0. A balanced collective
choice reflecting the respective strength in numbers of each group is given
by case (c).
7.4 The leader case
In most groups, persons are not all equal in status. The inequality can stem
from either a strong character or an institutional position, like for instance a
group president who has a tie-breaking vote. To account for such situations it
is enough to associate a stronger individual field to the leading person in the
group. In other words the leader case is a special case of a strong minority
which reduces to one person.
We can thus use the minority case equations putting M = 1. In the case
of a charismatic leader we take α ∼ 0 with 0 < α < 1 to emphasize its weak
aspect. However for another kind of leader, the authoritarian for instance, an
external field would account for the pressure the leader applies to all group
members.
Let us consider a leader with a positive representation S1 = +S0. The
majority figure is then N − 1 with an unequal negative representation Sj =
−αS0. Denoting c
+
0 and c
−
j as the respective leader and majority choices. The
collective choice is given by C = c+0 +(N−1)c
−
j . The internal conflict function is
G = n
2(N−1)IC
2+(c+0 −(N−1)αc
−
j )S0. The associated four choice configurations
are, (a) c+0 = +1; c
−
j = +1; C = N , (b) c
+
0 = −1; c
−
j = −1; C = −N , (c)
c+0 = +1; c
−
j = −1; C = 2−N , (d) c
+
0 = −1; c
−
j = +1; C = −2 +N .
The first two (a and b) are leader-majority agreement while the others (c
20
and d) are leader-majority conflict. Associated internal conflict functions are,
G(a) = −γ+Nγ+{(1+α)−αN}S0, G(b) = −γ+Nγ−{(1+α)−αN}S0, G(c) =
−γ+ γ
N
(2−N)2+{(1−α)+αN}S0, G(d) = −γ+
γ
N
(2−N)2−{(1−α)+αN}S0.
Analysis of above expressions is as complicated as in the minority case
with parameters N , nI, S0 and α. Let us comment on some cases. Again,
case (d) is never selected since indeed nothing is satisfied in that case, neither
interactions nor representations.
• Interaction effects are winning over representation effects: the group is
polarized, i. e., G(a) or G(b) > G(c).
a The leader wins, turning the majority to its side if G(a) > G(b). It
is the case if 1
α
< N − 1. Condition G(a) > G(c) is ensured by
nI > (N − 1)αS0.
b The majority wins, turning the minority to its side if G(a) < G(b).
It is the case if 1
α
< N − 1. Condition G(b) > G(c) is ensured by
nI > S0. The condition does not depend on α since in both cases
(b) and (c) the majority follows its own representation −αS0.
• Representation effects are winning over interaction effects: the group is
balanced, i. e., G(a) and G(b) < G(c).
Condition G(a) < G(c) is ensured by nI < (N − 1)αS0 and condition
G(b) < G(c) by nI < S0. A balanced collective choice reflecting the
respective numerical strength of each group is given by case (c).
8 Conclusion
A simple Ising-like model has been presented to describe group decision mak-
ing. It is indeed a modified version of the random field Ising ferromagnetic
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model in an external magnetic field at zero temperature. however our sys-
tem is finite in size and fields may have a non-zero configurational average.
in principle results may also depend on the field configuration. Moreover we
crossover in the group decision making process from a class of Ising variables
to one continuous variable.
The hypothesis behind our approach is that group decision making obeys
universal laws which are independent of the nature of the issue at stake. Our
main results with respect to the qualitative properties of group decision making
are,
* Exchanges among individual does not aim to select an issue, but rather to
align people along the same issue. The issue itself is random with respect
to exchanges.
* Exchanges among individual does not favor compromise about an issue. On
the opposite it produces polarization, i. e., extreme options.
* Reducing exchanges favors compromise.
* External social pressure is extremely efficient on selecting an option.
* Individual bias is a necessary ingredient to both weaken extreme option and
oppose an external social pressure.
These theoretical results must be put in parallel to various data obtained
from a large number of experimental studies which show groups polarize along
an extreme position reflecting the dominant pole of attitudes and not around
an average position as a priori expected [16, 17].
Our emphasize is on building a conceptual methodology rather than a
final complete theory. In a forthcoming paper we will introduce non-rational
behavior which is a real life basic feature. It will be analogus to temperature.
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However within our model we will define a “local temperature” in a finite
system.
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